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Abstract
In this paper we draw upon the close relationship between statistical physics and math-
ematical ﬁnance to develop a suite of models for ﬁnancial bubbles and crashes. The derived
models allow for a probabilistic and statistical formulation of econophysics models closely
linked to mainstream ﬁnancial models. Applications include monitoring the stability of ﬁ-
nancial systems and the subsequent policy implications. We emphasise the timeliness of
our contribution with an application to the two largest cryptocurrency markets: Bitcoin
and Ripple. Results shed new light on emerging debates over the nature of cryptocurrency
markets and competition between rival digital currencies.
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1 Introduction
Econophysics is an interdisciplinary subject that applies tools and techniques from theoretical
and statistical physics to model ﬁnancial and economic systems (Chen and Li, 2012; Mantegna
and Stanley, 1999). For an introduction to econophysics and a comparison between ﬁnance and
physics see Sornette (2014). As the econophysics movement has gained momentum our paper
thus contributes to wider debates such as probabilistic and statistical approaches to econophysics
(Bree and Joseph, 2013; Lin et al., 2014), the development of links between econophysics and
mainstream ﬁnancial models (Johansen et al., 2000) and the creation of tools to monitor the
stability of ﬁnancial systems and the subsequent policy implications that work in econophysics
holds (Sornette, 2003; Fry, 2015).
Econophysics has been used to tackle a wide range of practical problems in ﬁnance and
economics. This includes applications to options pricing and risk management (Bouchaud and
Potters, 2003), the statistical characterisation of heavy-tailed asset returns distributions (Cont,
2001), empirical power-laws (Gabaix et al., 2003; Plerou et al. 2004), agent-based modelling
(see e.g. Hommes, 2006; Le Baron, 2006), income-tax evasion (Pickhardt and Seibold, 2014),
speculative bubbles (Johansen et al., 2000; Sornette, 2003) and the impact of high-frequency
trading upon the stability of global ﬁnancial markets (Filimonov and Sornette, 2012). One
practical problem that econophysics has recently begun to address is the issue of Bitcoin and
cryptocurrency markets.
Amid huge media and public interest Bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets present enormous
legal (Grinberg, 2012; Plasaras, 2013), regulatory (European Central Bank, 2012; Ali et al.,
2014; Gandal and Ha laburda, 2014) and ethical (Angel and McCabe, 2015) challenges. Cryp-
tocurrency markets have also been extremely volatile with the market share and market capitali-
sations of several cryptocurrencies ﬂuctuating wildly (White, 2014). Though initially dominated
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by other disciplines the ﬁnancial and economic literature on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies has
recently started to emerge (see e.g. Dowd, 2014; Dwyer, 2015; Weber, 2014a). Cryptocurren-
cies have also been the focus of several recent econophysics papers (see e.g. Kristoufek, 2013;
Garcia et al., 2014; Cheah and Fry, 2015). Their dependence on self-fulﬁlling expectations and
the lack of a centralised governance body mean that, without wishing to exaggerate the impor-
tance of econophysics, cryptocurrency markets may prove especially amenable to econophysics
approaches.
The objective of this paper is to showcase the use of tools and techniques from econophysics
via a novel application to the two largest cryptocurrency markets. The importance of our con-
tribution is ﬁvefold. Firstly, we develop an econophysics model for bubbles and crashes that
can be ﬁtted to empirical ﬁnancial data using standard statistical techniques such as maximum
likelihood estimation. Whilst applicable to general ﬁnancial markets our model may thus have
speciﬁc relevance to cryptocurrency markets. Secondly, we contribute to a ﬂedgling academic lit-
erature on Bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets. Thirdly, we ﬁnd empirical evidence of negative
bubbles in cryptocurrency markets – complementing earlier documented evidence of speculative
bubbles in the literature. Fourthly, we address the issue of competition between rival cryptocur-
rencies. This is signiﬁcant as the issue of contagion and co-dependence is particularly pertinent
for cryptocurrency markets. One notable example of this is that the market share of the two
largest cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ripple has ﬂuctuated quite dramatically in recent months.
Here, we ﬁnd evidence of a spillover from Ripple to Bitcoin. Fifthly, we develop a model to inde-
pendently verify the impact of putative market shocks (identiﬁed by academics and practitioners
alike) upon Bitcoin. Results suggest that cryptocurrency markets are inherently complex and
are often misunderstood by academics and practitioners alike.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of econophysics and
reviews the academic literature on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. Section 3 develops the basic
bubble/antibubble model and its extension to higher dimensions. Section 4 discusses a model
for unpredictable market shocks. The model is later used to track the eﬀect of events such as the
closure of the illegal Silk Road website and the collapse of the Tokyo-based Bitcoin exchange Mt.
Gox upon Bitcoin prices. Empirical applications are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Econophysics and the analysis of financial crashes
Econophysics is perhaps best deﬁned as the use of paradigms and tools from theoretical and
statistical physics to model ﬁnancial and economic systems (Mantegna and Stanley, 1999). The
movement has a long history. For a historical overview see e.g. Jovanovic and Schinckus (2013)
and Chen and Li (2012). The term econophysics was ﬁrst coined in Stanley et al. (1996) and
the modern arm of the movement can trace its origins to several key developments that occurred
in the 1990s. These include technical developments in the mathematics of Le´vy processes and
the development of increased computer processing power together with the ready availability of
large electronic ﬁnancial databases. Allied to the above as time has progressed several economics
and ﬁnance journals have also become more receptive to ideas from econophysics (Jovanovic and
Schinckus, 2013).
Speculation and ﬁnancial crises have been endemic throughout human history (Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ, 2009). Bubbles typically occur when the price of an asset grows rapidly and does so in
a manner far removed from realistic assessments of the asset’s intrinsic value (Phillips and Yu,
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2011). The implication is that such a dramatic price rise sets up asset prices for a subsequent
fall. Kindelberger and Aliber (2005) describe bubbles as a sharp rise in asset prices – with
the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers via a process
commonly labelled irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2005). However, beyond these deﬁnitions,
and real economic suﬀering, both the theoretical existence of bubbles, and issues related to their
empirical detection, remain hotly debated (Gurkaynak, 2008; Vogel and Werner, 2015).
From a statistical physics perspective stock market crashes represent a rupture event in
a complex system (Feigenbaum, 2003). This analogy with exactly soluble models in statistical
mechanics led to the development of phenomenological log-periodic power-law models for bubbles
where the price exhibits unsustainably high super-exponential growth (Feigenbaum and Freund
1996; Sornette et al., 1996). A rational expectations version of the original model was then
formulated in Johansen et al. (2000) thereby forming a potential bridge with the mainstream
economics and ﬁnance literature. Despite some initial controversy (see e.g. Feigenbaum 2001a-
b) econophysics modelling of ﬁnancial bubbles has continued to grow from strength to strength
– in part as a response to the increasingly volatile nature of global ﬁnancial markets.
Even before the 2008 crisis one dramatic unintended consequence of the increased comput-
erisation of ﬁnancial markets described above was increased speculation and volatility (Barber
and Odean, 2001). This in turn has lent weight to the empirically oriented approach favoured
by econophysics as ﬁnancial markets evolved. Statistical physics, and its reincarnation into
econophysics, is chieﬂy concerned with providing the best possible explanation of empirically
observable phenomena. This contrasts sharply with the rigid theoretical frameworks often as-
sociated with both ﬁnancial economics and mathematical ﬁnance (Jovanovic and Schinckus,
2013).The modelling of ﬁnancial bubbles and crashes has thus emerged as a key part of the
wider econophysics movement (Feigenbaum, 2003). This has gained added impetus since the
2008 crisis with several econophysics papers modelling bubbles and crashes appearing in well-
respected ﬁnance and economics journals in recent years (see e.g. Kurz-Kim, 2012; Bree and
Joseph, 2013; Lin and Sornette, 2013; Geraskin and Fantazzini, 2013; Lin et al., 2014).
A range of empirical ﬁndings reported in the literature suggest that econophysics can indeed
generate useful insights into real markets. For example, econophysics can be used to shed new
light into the monetary roots of bubbles and crashes (Corsi and Sornette, 2014). In line with
this practically-minded approach the functioning of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency markets
represents an interesting problem in its own right and one that also presents new challenges to
mainstream economics and ﬁnance (see Section 2.2).
2.2 The cryptocurrency market
The use of cryptocurrencies has gained traction in response to the perceived failures of govern-
ment and central banks during the 2008 crash (Weber, 2014a). Bitcoin and other cryptocur-
rencies may also oﬀer cheaper alternatives to existing debit and credit card systems (Angel and
McCabe, 2015), in part reﬂecting recent technological innovations in regular monetary systems
(European Central Bank, 2012; Bo¨hme et al., 2015). Amid huge media and public interest the
academic literature on Bitcoin is only recently starting to emerge (see e.g. Frisby, 2014; Vigna
and Casey, 2015). Initially the debate surrounding the use of cryptocurrencies appeared to be
dominated both by Bitcoin and by other disciplines such as computer science (see e.g. Sadeghi,
2013; Bo¨hme et al, 2014) and law (see e.g. Grinberg, 2012; Plasaras, 2013). However, as dis-
cussed in this subsection, a ﬂedgling economics and ﬁnance literature is starting to emerge. In
particular, previous literature on Bitcoin raises several interesting questions such as the exact
nature of Bitcoin, the long-term sustainability of Bitcoin, competition in the market for digital
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currencies and an on-going ethical debate surrounding Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. Our paper
also contributes to these discussions and adds to a burgeoning econophysics literature on Bitcoin
and cryptocurrencies.
The cryptocurrency market warrants close scrutiny given its increasingly high proﬁle. The
sums of money involved are substantial. The total cryptocurrency market capitalisation is
estimated to be $7.1 billion (www.coinmarketcap.com , January 2016). Amongst over 600 traded
cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ripple are the two most popular cryptocurrencies with around 91
percent and 2.8 percent of the entire cryptocurrency market capitalization respectively though
as recently as May 2015 the market share of Ripple was as high as 6 percent. Ripple and Bitcoin
share important characteristics such as their ultimate dependence upon the trust of their users
and a unique network currency (Bitcoin for Bitcoin and XRP in Ripple respectively). However,
there are also important diﬀerences. Ripple is primarily designed to serve as a medium of
exchange and as a distributed payment system as opposed to an alternative currency per se.
Ripple is thus arguably more like a new improved form of PayPal or Mastercard than a “digital
dollar”. This ready convertibility means the Ripple network itself actually accepts Bitcoin
and, inter alia, allows users to trade precious metals like gold and silver, cryptocurrencies,
conventional currencies like the US Dollar and the GB Pound and even assets like air miles with
lower transaction costs using its own native digital currency – the XRP. This added ﬂexibility
makes Ripple a strong potential rival to Bitcoin. Despite its obvious relevance and importance
research into Ripple appears to be almost non-existent due to its lack of widespread usage prior
to 2013.
Though it is a highly unconventional and fast-moving area it is important to note that there
is a wealth of available statistical information about Bitcoin and other digital currencies that
renders academic study of the area entirely possible. One key source of information (rather than
an exchange site or place for investment advice is www.coinmarketcap.com. Coinmarketcap.com
has been a key data source used in previous academic studies (see e.g. Dowd, 2014; White, 2014;
Cheah and Fry, 2015). Further, the site’s links with a diverse range of Bitcoin wikis and forums
reinforces both its importance to practitioners and its wider usage. Coinmarketcap.com provides
data about listed coins such as price, available supply, trade volume and market capitalisation
(deﬁned as the price multiplied by the available supply). Prices are calculated by averaging
prices quoted at major exchanges weighted by volume. Every eﬀort is made to provide timely
information. Statistics are updated every ﬁve minutes and coins with stale datapoints (more
than six hours old) are shown at the bottom of the listings accompanied by question marks and
de-listed after seven days. Coinmarketcap.com also has a dedicated forum in Bitcointalk.org
where suggestions for new listed currencies can be made.
However, in addition to providing timely information coins listed on coinmarketcap.com
must also satisfy rigorous assessment criteria. Firstly, based on information such as the total
number in circulation coins must be deemed to constitute a genuine cryptocurrency. Secondly,
coins must be traded on a public exchange that is more than thirty days old and with an
active Application Programming Interface (API) available. Essentially this means that all listed
cryptocurrencies must be genuinely tradable. Thirdly, listed coins must satisfy a transparency
requirement and have a public URL that displays the total supply (total coins used so far).
In the literature it remains unclear as to whether or not Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies should
be seen as an alternative currency or as a speculative asset. Bitcoin’s own digital mining pro-
cesses are intended to replicate the production costs associated with commodities like precious
metals. Bitcoin’s convertibility and low transaction costs also share elements of currencies
(Frisby, 2014). Bitcoin prices appear to be particularly susceptible to market sentiments and
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dramatic boom-bust episodes (Weber, 2014a; Cheung et al., 2015; Cheah and Fry, 2015) under-
mining the role that Bitcoin might play as a store of value. The unpredictability and volatility in
Bitcoin prices also requires that merchants accepting Bitcoin incorporate a spread over the price
in the original currency. This undermines the role Bitcoin plays as a unit of account. Selgin
(2015), Yermack (2013) and Baeck and Elbeck (2015) argue that Bitcoin should be seen as a
speculative commodity rather than a currency. Yermack (2013) lists several features that could
lead to Bitcoin failing as a currency such as cybersecurity risks, lack of a central governance
structure, Bitcoin’s comparatively small level of adoption, the diversity of Bitcoin prices across
diﬀerent exchanges and problems with the interpretability of Bitcoin prices due to the relatively
high cost in Bitcoins for ordinary products and services.
Alongside these fears the long-term sustainability of Bitcoin has also come under scrutiny.
Bitcoin was originally conceived as a decentralised network beyond the control of national gov-
ernments (Weber, 2014a). However, some authors also see the lack of a centralised governance
body as an essential weakness (Weber, 2014a). Others see money as inherently linked to the deﬁ-
nition of the state (Van Alstyne, 2014; Dequech, 2013) – even if some elements of credit creation
and money supply in modern economies lie beyond state control (Dequech, 2013). Ultimate
limits upon the supply of Bitcoin have also raised fears about the potential for a debt-deﬂation
spiral (Weber, 2014b; Bo¨hme et al., 2015) in a similar manner to the problems that dogged
gold-backed currencies in the last century due to the decoupling of credit creation and money
supply. Allied to questions of long-term sustainability several studies also examine the issue of
competition between Bitcoin and other alternative cryptocurrencies – sometimes labelled alt-
coins (Dowd, 2014; Gandal and Ha laburda, 2014; Rogajanu and Badea, 2014). Concerns are
raised in Dowd (2014) that its design ﬂaws may ultimately make Bitcoin vulnerable to competing
altcoins in the long-term. However, it remains unclear as to the extent to which the two largest
cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ripple are in direct competition with each other (Coinsetter, 2013).
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies also raise several important ethical issues. These include con-
cerns that the anonymity endowed by cryptocurrencies may encourage illegal activities, cyber-
security worries and fears over the continued ability of governments to raise taxes. Inter alia a
large legal literature (see e.g. Kaplanov, 2012; Dion, 2013; Bryans, 2014; Doguet, 2012; Varri-
ale, 2013; Yang, 2013; Twomey, 2013) thus reﬂects both a variety of ethical concerns raised by
Bitcoin and a diverse international experience (Van Alstyne, 2014; Pilkington, 2014). In view of
these concerns it is interesting to examine both the nature of the booms and crashes that occur
on cryptocurrency markets and the extent to which government and law enforcement measures
aﬀect these markets.
Our paper also contributes to a burgeoning econophysics literature – directly motivated by
the empirical study of cryptocurrency markets. An overview of the application of complex
systems theory applied to Bitcoin is given by Pilkington (2014). Using an econophysics model
Cheah and Fry (2015) ﬁnd evidence of a bubble in Bitcoin. Soumya et al. (2015) examine
the stylised empirical facts of cryptocurrency markets. Kandor et al. (2014) and Ober et
al. (2013) apply network theory to study the empirical properties of the Bitcoin transaction
graph. Kristoufek (2013) uses a bi-directional relationship between internet searches (google
and wikipedia) and Bitcoin prices to quantify the recent bubble. An expanded version of this
study is contained in Garcia et al. (2014) who consider both information on new Bitcoin users
and word-of-mouth information on Social Media (Twitter) in addition to information on Internet
searches (google trends) to explain Bitcoin price changes. Allied to wider questions of Bitcoin’s
ﬁnancial deﬁnition and long-term sustainability a number of studies have looked into more
detailed economic aspects of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency markets. Owens and Lavich
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(2013) study the implications of cryptocurrencies for online gambling with the comment made
in Dwyer (2015) that online gambling stimulates a large amount of activity in Bitcoin. Yelowitz
and Wilson (2015) use Google Trends search data to examine the determinants of interest in
Bitcoin and ﬁnd that interest in Bitcoin seems to be primarily driven by a mixture of computer-
programming enthusiasts and illegal activity. Econometric evidence of bubbles in cryptocurrency
markets is found in Cheung et al. (2015) and Cheah and Fry (2015) – thus hinting at the potential
signiﬁcance of econophysics for cryptocurrency markets.
In Sections 3-4 we derive the econophysics models needed for the analysis of empirical data
in Section 5.
3 Bubbles and negative bubbles
3.1 Univariate bubbles and negative bubbles
Let Pt denote the price of an asset at time t and let Xt = log Pt. Following Johansen et al.
(2000) our starting point is the equation
P (t) = P1(t)(1− κ)j(t), (1)
where P1(t) satisﬁes
dP1(t) =
[
µ(t) + σ2(t)/2
]
P1(t)dt+ σ(t)P1(t)dWt, (2)
where Wt is a Wiener process and j(t) is a jump process satisfying
j(t) =
{
0 before the crash
1 after the crash.
(3)
When a crash occurs κ% is automatically wiped oﬀ the value of the asset. Prior to a crash
P (t) = P1(t) and it follows from Itoˆ’s formula that Xt = log(P (t)) satisﬁes
dXt = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dWt − vdj(t), (4)
where v = − ln[(1 − κ)] > 0. Equation (4) shows us how the bubble will impact upon observed
prices. Suppose that a crash has not occurred by time t. In this case we have that
E[j(t+∆)− j(t)] = ∆h(t) + o(∆), (5)
Var[j(t+∆)− j(t)] = ∆h(t) + o(∆), (6)
where h(t) is the hazard rate.
Assumption 1 (Intrinsic Rate of Return) The intrinsic rate of return is assumed constant
and equal to µ:
E[Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt] = µ∆+ o(∆). (7)
First-order condition. From Assumption 1 equations (4-5) and (7) give
µ(t)− vh(t) = µ; µ(t) = µ+ vh(t). (8)
Equation (8) shows the rate of return must increase in order to compensate a representative
investor for the risk of a crash. However, it can be shown that bubbles also impact upon the
volatility (see below).
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Assumption 2 (Intrinsic Level of Risk) The intrinsic level of risk is assumed constant and
equal to σ2:
Var[Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt] = σ2∆+ o(∆). (9)
Second-order condition. For a bubble to develop a rapid growth in prices alone is not enough.
The perceived price risk must also diminish. Similarly, from Assumption 2 equations (4), (6)
and (9) give
σ2(t) + v2h(t) = σ2; σ2(t) = σ2 − v2h(t). (10)
The model thus states that it is the interplay between risk and return that fundamentally governs
the behaviour of ﬁnancial markets. Assumptions 1-2 show that bubbles can be identiﬁed via
anomalous behaviour in the drift and volatility in equation (4). During a bubble a representative
investor is compensated for the crash risk by an increased rate of return with µ(t) > µ the long-
term rate of return. This is accompanied by a decrease in the volatility function σ2(t) – a result
which though counter-intuitive actually represents market over-conﬁdence (Fry, 2012; 2014).
Speciﬁcation of the hazard rate thus completes the model. Here, we follow Fry (2012, 2014) in
using
h(t) =
βtβ−1
αβ + tβ
. (11)
Equations (8) and (10) above mean that we can test for the existence of a speculative bubble
by testing the one-sided hypothesis
H0 : v = 0, H1 : v > 0. (12)
Formulating the model in this way allows us to account for the fact that ﬁnancial and economic
time series often exhibit approximately exponential behaviour over long time horizons (Campbell
et al., 1997). Further, this approach also allows us to account for the fact that prices may undergo
substantial periods of growth even in the absence of a bubble.
A negative bubble represents the mirror image of a speculative bubble (Yan et al., 2012).
Just as speculative bubbles result in dramatic price rises negative bubbles result in a dramatic
price falls. Negative bubbles can be modelled by replacing v with −v in the above (Yan et al.,
2012). In particular, we can test for the presence of a negative bubble by testing the one-sided
hypothesis
H0 : v = 0, H1 : v < 0. (13)
This elegant formulation thus builds on the previous deﬁnition of negative bubbles in the econo-
physics literature (Yan et al., 2012). This complements an important body of work in the
econophysics literature on antibubbles or time-reversed bubbles where t is replaced by −t in
the usual deﬁnition of a speculative bubble. For more on the deﬁnition and empirical testing
of antibubbles see e.g. Johansen and Sornette (1999), (2001) and Zhou and Sornette (2004a-b),
(2005).
3.2 The multivariate model
In this subsection we discuss multivariate models for bubbles. These describe the price of more-
than-one asset simultaneously and are signiﬁcant for empirical applications (Fry, 2014; Sornette
7
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
and Malevergne, 2006). Let Pt denote the prices (P
1
t , . . ., P
p
t ) of a basket of p assets at time t.
Deﬁne Xt = (X
1
t , . . .,X
p
t ) where X
i
t = log P
i
t . For the multivariate model Assumptions 1-2 are
replaced by their vector/matrix analogues.
Assumption 1: [Intrinsic Rate of Return] The intrinsic rate of return is assumed constant
and equal to µ:
E[Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt] = µ∆+ o(∆). (14)
Assumption 2: [Intrinsic Level of Risk] The intrinsic level of risk is assumed constant and
equal to Σ:
Var[Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt] = Σ∆+ o(∆). (15)
Co-ordinatewise our starting equation (1) becomes
pi(t) = pi1(t)
(1−κi)ji(t) (16)
and before the crash Xt satisﬁes the vector-valued equation
dXt = µ(t)dt+
√
Σ(t)dWt − vdj(t), (17)
where v is the diagonal matrix satisfying vii = − ln(1 − κi) = vi. As in Section 3.1 replacing vi
with −vi in the above yields a model for a multivariate negative bubble.
Assumption 1 above yields a vector-valued re-statement of equation (8):
µ(t)− vh(t) = µ; µ(t) = µ+ vh(t). (18)
Similarly, Assumption 2 shows that the second-order condition now becomes
Σ(t) + vΣjv
Th(t) = Σ; Σ(t) = Σ− vΣjvTh(t). (19)
where Σj denotes the correlation matrix of j(t). Equation (19) shows how correlation in the
bubble process is transferred to prices prior to the crash. Genuinely high-dimensional and
multivariate models are possible though it seems that these may lose some interpretability.
Bivariate models seem to be by far the most convenient and natural to use in applications – see
Section 3.3.
3.3 A bivariate bubble model
In a bivariate extension of the preceding univariate and multivariate models equation (17) be-
comes
dXt = µ(t)dt+
√
Σ(t)dWt − vdj(t), (20)
where Xt = (X1(t),X2(t))
T denotes the log-price of Assets 1 and 2 at time t, Σ(t) is the
instantaneous covariance and Wt is standard bivariate Brownian motion. Assumption 1 gives
µ1(t) = µ1 + v1h(t); µ2(t) = µ2 + v2h(t). (21)
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Assumption 2 gives
Σ(t) =
(
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
)
−
(
v1 0
0 v2
)(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)(
v1 0
0 v2
)
h(t),
=
(
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
)
−
(
v21 ρv1v2
ρv1v2 v
2
1
)
h(t). (22)
In addition to equation (10) the phase-transition condition also gives
min
t
|Σ(t)| = 0; min
t
σ12 − ρv1v2h(t) = 0. (23)
Equation (23) thus clariﬁes that the bubble constitutes a phase transition between random and
deterministic behaviour in prices (see e.g. Fry, 2012).
Historical Estimation Bias. The above also serve to highlight possible dangers regarding
historical estimation bias and coincides with fears over illusory diversiﬁcation raised in Vogel
and Werner (2015). During a bubble regime prices may be rising at artiﬁcially high rates
with comparatively little volatility compared to the underlying long-term values. Equation
(22) is also useful in highlighting that using historical prices in a bubble regime may lead to
under-diversiﬁed portfolios as a consequence of under-estimating long-term correlation levels in
returns series. If a crash occurs at time t0, in addition to an increase in marginal volatility, the
covariance of ∆X1(t0) and ∆X2(t0) increases by a factor of ρv1v2h(t0) (from σ12 − ρv1v2h(t0)
to its equilibrium value of σ12).
3.3.1 Spillovers and Contagion
In this section we develop a method to test for the presence or absence of contagion during
bubbles and negative bubbles. We therefore present a mathematical treatment of a serious
practical problem. Many papers discuss the modelling of spillovers on conventional markets (see
e.g. Blasco et al., 2012; Hsieh, 2013). However, doing a comparable analysis on cryptocurrency
markets is more challenging and requires a more mathematical approach. For cryptocurrency
markets detailed information on direct transactions (e.g. paired occurrences of short positions
in one currency and long positions in another) or indeed direct transaction volumes between two
diﬀerent cryptocurrencies do not typically exist.
The above discussion leads naturally to an empirical test for contagious eﬀects that arise
with bubbles and negative bubbles. As discussed below this involves testing the hypothesis
shown in equation (27). Suppose we have two assets whose prices are given by eX(t) and eY (t).
Let ∆Xt = Xt+1−Xt. Under the model (20) knowledge of Y (t) reduces uncertainty in X(t) by
Var[∆X(t)]−Var[∆X(t)|∆Y (t)] = Var[∆Xt]− (1− Cor2(∆Xt,∆Yt))Var[∆Xt]
= Cor2(∆Xt,∆Yt)Var[∆Xt]. (24)
Similarly, knowledge of X(t) reduces uncertainty in Y (t) by the amount
Var[∆Y (t)]−Var[∆Y (t)|∆X(t)] = Cor2(∆Xt,∆Yt)Var[∆Yt]. (25)
The constraints σ2X(t)≥0 and σ2Y (t)≥0 imply that
σ2X =
v2X(β − 1)1−
1
β
α
; σ2Y =
v2Y (β − 1)1−
1
β
α
. (26)
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Contagion from Y (t) to X(t) occurs if Y (t) is more informative about X(t) than X(t) is about
Y (t). From equations (24-26) contagion from Y (t) to X(t) occurs if
Cor2(∆Xt,∆Yt)Var[∆Xt] < Cor
2(∆Xt,∆Yt)Var[∆Yt]
Var[∆Xt] < Var[∆Yt]
v2X
[
(β − 1)1− 1β
α
− ln
(
αβ + (t+ 1)β
αβ + tβ
)]
< v2Y
[
(β − 1)1− 1β
α
− ln
(
αβ + (t+ 1)β
αβ + tβ
)]
v2X < v
2
Y . (27)
Equation (27) is signiﬁcant as it shows that contagion occurs as the overall bubble process
becomes dominated by price rises and speculation in Asset Y . Similarly in a negative bubble
contagion from Y (t) to X(t) occurs as speculation that drives down the price of Y (t) becomes
the dominant eﬀect.
Equation (27) leads to the following hypothesis test to determine the presence of contagion
during both bubbles and negative bubbles
H0 : |vX | = |vY |; H1 : |vX |6=|vY |. (28)
The direction of departure from the null hypothesis in equation (28) indicates the direction of
contagion. If |vX | < |vY | we have contagion from Y to X. In contrast if |vX | > |vY | we have
contagion from X to Y .
4 Unpredictable market shocks
Suppose that the market is exposed to an unpredictable shock. The timing of the shock is
assumed to be completely unpredictable. If the shock is exogenous in nature then its aﬀect is
merely transitory (Sornette and Helmstetter, 2003). In contrast, the after-eﬀects of an endoge-
nous shock are potentially much longer lasting.
The shock occurs at time 0 and results in an initial decrease in drift by the amount µ0 and an
initial increase in volatility by the amount σ20 . As an arbitrage opportunity has to be eliminated,
the market recovers at the random time t0 – the drift increases by µ0 and volatility decreases by
σ20 . The time t0 of the market recovery is a random variable with hazard function h(t). Since
the eﬀect of an exogenous shock is transitory it follows that in this case h′(t) > 0, since as time
progresses a market rebound becomes increasingly likely. Also, since the shock is assumed to
happen at t = 0 it follows that we must also have h(0) = 0:
h′(t) > 0; h(0) = 0. (29)
The price dynamics prior to the market recovery are described by the following equation
dXt = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dWt + dj(t). (30)
The form of j(t) is explicitly chosen to represent the fact that when a recovery happens the
eﬀect is an increase in the drift (representing better returns post-recovery) and a decrease in
variance (representing a reduction in the level of risk post-recovery and necessitating use of the
complex number below). As such we follow Fry (2012) in assuming j(t) satisﬁes
dj(t) = µ0δ(t − t0)dt+ iσ0δ(t− t0)dWt, (31)
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where i =
√−1 and δ(·) denotes Dirac’s delta function. Prior to the recovery we have that
E[Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt] = (µ(t) + µ0h(t))∆ + o(∆). (32)
Thus, from Assumption 1 (equation 7) it follows that
µ(t) = µ− µ0h(t). (33)
Equation (33) shows that the shock reduces the level of return. The risk (variance) associated
with equation (30) is
Var (Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt) = Var [σ(t) (Wt+∆ −Wt)] + Var [j(t+∆)|j(t) = 0] (34)
This gives
Var (Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt) = σ2(t)∆ + Var[E(j(t +∆)|j(t) = 0)] (35)
+ E[Var(j(t+∆)|j(t) = 0)] + o(∆); (36)
Var (Xt+∆ −Xt|Xt) =
(
σ2(t) +
(
µ20 − σ20
)
h(t)
)
∆+ o(∆). (37)
Similarly, it follows from Assumption 2 (equation 9) that
σ2(t) +
(
µ2o − σ20
)
h(t) = σ2; σ2(t) = σ2 +
(
σ20 − µ20
)
h(t). (38)
If σ20≥µ20 the shock aﬀects volatility more than it does the drift. The shock thus results in an
increase in market volatility alongside a decrease in drift. If σ20≤µ20 the shock actually results
in a reduction in volatility. However, irrespective of the eﬀect upon market volatility the shock
decreases the rate of return so is still likely to remain bad news for investors. If σ20 = µ
2
0 market
volatility remains unaﬀected.
In empirical work we choose
h(t) = λ[1− (1 + t)−α]. (39)
Not only does h(t) in (39) satisfy (29) but the special case α = 0.5 in (39) recreates both the
empirical power-law reported in Sornette et al. (2003) and related phenomenology in Sornette
and Helmstetter (2003). Equation (39) also provides a natural empirical test for the presence of
an exogenous/endogenous shock (see below).
From (39) it follows that
σ2(t) = σ2 + β[1− (1 + t)−α], (40)
where β = λ(σ20 − µ20). The case α = 0 corresponds to the case of an eﬃcient market where
price changes are completely unpredictable and we are left with the classical random walk or
Black-Scholes model:
dXt = µdt+ σdW t. (41)
In empirical work we test the hypothesis
H0 : α = 0; H1 : α6=0. (42)
The link with statistical physics means that we can interpret rejection of the null hypothesis in
(42) as follows:
11
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Endogenous shock. If α < 0 (and β < 0) then σ2(t) increases without bound. This represents
the fundamental uncertainty related to an endogenous shock (Fry, 2012).
Exogenous shock. If α > 0 (and β > 0) the market recovery becomes the inevitable phase
transition between random and deterministic behaviour with
lim
t→∞
σ2(t) = 0. (43)
This suggests that
σ2 + β = 0; σ2 = −β. (44)
5 Empirical applications
5.1 Bubbles and negative bubbles
The global cryptocurrency market is still evolving and, as such, represents a fascinating ﬁeld of
study - especially for econophysics. Information on market capitalisation and market share are
readily available from the authoritative website coinmarketcap.com. In particular, as discussed
in White (2014) the cryptocurrency market shows some ﬂuidity with both market share and
market capitalisations ﬂuctuating wildly in recent years. This is especially true for Bitcoin
whose market share has decreased from around 91% from as recently as November 2014 to as
little as 84% in February 2015 back to around 91% again in January 2016 during the latest
revision of this paper. These ﬂuctuations in market share reﬂect wider concerns raised about
Bitcoin’s long-term sustainability (Dowd, 2014). Against this backdrop Ripple has recently
emerged as the largest alternative cryptocurrency (or altcoin) to Bitcoin. At the time of the
ﬁrst draft of this paper (May, 2015) the market share of Ripple was as high as 6% though this
has recently dropped to around 2.8% in January 2016 during the revisions for this paper.
Competition between diﬀerent cryptocurrencies is an interesting issue (see e.g. White, 2014;
Gandal and Ha laburda, 2014; Rogojanu and Badea, 2014; Dowd, 2014). However, one further
complication is that it is far from clear that in practical terms Ripple and Bitcoin are in direct
competition with each other. Some practitioners have expressed the view that the growth of the
Ripple network may actually make Bitcoins substantially easier to buy and sell. Further, one
prediction made was that XRPs (the native currency of the Ripple network) may be used to
transfer money across ﬁnancial institutions whilst Bitcoins may be primarily held by individual
investors (Coinsetter, 2013).
When analysing Bitcoin and Ripple it is important to recognise key diﬀerences in the con-
struction of both currencies. Bitcoin was conceived as a decentralised currency supposedly
immune from successive episodes of devaluation that have dogged centrally backed national cur-
rencies (Dowd, 2014). Bitcoin thus had an initial monetary supply of zero and its own digital
mining processes are intended to mimic a key tenet of currencies backed by precious metals
i.e. scarcity reinforced by limited supply and free from artiﬁcial manipulation (Frisby, 2014).
In contrast, Ripple had an initial monetary supply of 100 billion XRP and remains vulnerable
to accusations of artiﬁcial price manipulation and hoarding by its originators. To a greater or
lesser extent similar comments apply to any currency, especially national currencies, without
Bitcoin’s decentralised mining processes that rigorously enforce the scarcity of supply (Dowd,
2014). These concerns notwithstanding Ripple has achieved signiﬁcant market penetration.
At the time of writing (January 2016) data on coinmarketcap.com lists Ripple as having an
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available supply of 33.5 billion XRP out of a total supply of 100 billion XRP. The market capi-
talisation (calculated as price × available supply) ranks Ripple signiﬁcantly ahead of the third
largest cryptocurrency Litecoin ($202.8m versus $153.8m).
As discussed above diﬀerences in construction mean that roughly 2/3 of Ripple’s total supply
is retained by its originators. However, this is akin to the estimated 73% of Bitcoins held
in dormant accounts (Weber, 2014a) and linked to speculative behaviour in Yermack (2013).
Since speculation plays such an important role in both markets it is interesting to examine
the potential for spillovers from Bitcoin to Ripple and vice versa. Further, since the amount
of currency in active circulation appears to be comparable across both markets we argue that
results are unlikely to be unduly inﬂuenced by artiﬁcial hoarding of Ripple by its originators.
The data consist of closing values of the Bitcoin Coindesk Index (downloaded from the web-
site Coindesk.com) and weekly closing prices of Ripple XRP (downloaded from the website
Ripplecharts.com). Both sources represent the industry standard and are, for instance, regu-
larly referenced on Coinmarketcap.com. A plot of weekly Ripple (XRP) and Bitcoin prices in
US Dollars over time is shown below in Figure 1. Both series show a dramatic spike upwards
throughout 2013 before falling precipitously throughout 2014. Empirical evidence of bubbles in
Bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets has now been well-documented (see e.g. Cheah and Fry,
2015; Garcia et al., 2014; Cheung et al., 2015). Hence, a more interesting question would appear
to be to test for the presence of a negative bubble from 2014 onwards.
The results of the statistical tests are shown below in Table 1. Results from both the
univariate and bivariate tests give strong evidence of a negative bubble. We also obtain a positive
result for the test for contagion. This suggests that during the negative bubble there is a spillover
from Ripple which then exacerbates the subsequent falls in Bitcoin. This interpretation mirrors
ﬁndings in Gandal and Ha laburda (2014) where the values of several altcoins are documented
to have risen relative to Bitcoin over a similar time period. A plot of Ripple (XRP) measured
in units of Bitcoin is shown below in Figure 2 and shows a general increase over the period in
question. Thus, with its added ﬂexibility, Ripple was thought by some to represent a serious
potential rival to Bitcoin. However, following helpful comments from an anonymous referee we
ﬁtted the univariate bubble model in Section 3.1 to Ripple prices measured in units of Bitcoin.
This gives signiﬁcant evidence (p = 0.000) of a bubble in Ripple. The implication would appear
to be that Ripple appears over-valued relative to Bitcoin. This appears to set the stage for
subsequent falls in the value Ripple relative to Bitcoin in the period between initial submission
and revision of this paper. Over the same period Bitcoin has also regained signiﬁcant market
share from Ripple (coinmarketcap.com).
5.2 Endogenous or exogenous market shocks
As an empirical application we examine the impact of various market shocks that are popularly
believed to have signiﬁcantly impacted upon bitcoin prices. Following established methodology
(Sornette et al., 2003; Johansen and Sornette, 2010; Fry, 2012) we test for the presence of an
exogenous shock in the ﬁrst 100 trading days following a putative shock. In particular, we
test the null hypothesis shown in equation (42). Events examined include a technical glitch in
the core Bitcoin software on March 11th 2013 (Dourado and Brito, 2014), the seizure by the
Department of Homeland Security of assets belonging to the Mt Gox bitcoin exchange (May
15th, 2013), the FBI’s closure of the Silk Road website (October 2nd, 2013), the People’s Bank
of China’s prohibition of Chinese ﬁnancial institutions from using bitcoins (December 5th, 2013),
the suspension of trading on the Bitcoin exchange Mt Gox due to technical issues on February
7th 2014 (Dourado and Brito, 2014) and the cyber attack on the Canada-based bitcoin bank
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Figure 1: Plot of weekly Ripple (XRP) and Bitcoin prices in US Dollars over time from Feb
26th 2013 to Feb 24th 2015. Left panel: Ripple (XRP). Right panel: Bitcoin.
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Univariate negative bubble test
vˆ e.s.e vˆ t-value p-value
Ripple (XRP) -0.168 0.007 23.254 0.000
Bitcoin -0.058 0.001 40.705 0.000
Bivariate negative bubble test
vˆ e.s.e vˆ t-value p-value
Ripple (XRP) -0.285 0.025 11.417 0.000
Bitcoin -0.174 0.015 11.417 0.000
Test for contagion t-value p-value
3.128 0.003
Table 1: Results for the statistical tests for negative bubbles (equation 13) and contagion (equa-
tion 28).
Flexicoin (March 2nd 2014). We also look at market shocks identiﬁed in the academic literature
such as the end of the 2011 bubble on October 18th 2011 (as identiﬁed in Garcia et al., 2014),
the so-called Halving Day on November 28th 2012 which is the point at which returns from
mining Bitcoins halved (Garcia et al., 2014) and a Bitcoin crash on April 13th 2013 identiﬁed
in Rogojanu and Badea (2014). The results obtained are shown below in Table 2 and Figure 3.
Numerical evidence in Table 2 and graphical evidence in Figure 3 both suggest that these
events have had a mixed impact upon the Bitcoin market. In particular, our model would appear
to dispute the timings of Bitcoin crashes previously deﬁned in the literature. Neither the events
of October 18th 2011 (identiﬁed in Garcia et al., 2014) nor of April 13th 2013 (identiﬁed in
Rogojanu and Badea, 2014) seem to have a lasting impact. Indeed not long after April 13th
2013 the Bitcoin bubble re-inﬂates.
There are also several instances when the market events have no detectable eﬀect. These
include the seizure of Mt. Gox assets by the Department of Homeland Security (May 15th
2013), the suspension of trading on Mt. Gox due to technical issues (February 7th 2014) and
the cyber attack on Flexicoin (March 2nd 2014). In contrast, the prohibition of Chinese ﬁnancial
institutions from using Bitcoin does have a detectable eﬀect upon prices. However, this event is
classiﬁed by our model as an exogenous shock. There is an interesting link here to wider economic
debates on the legitimacy and deﬁnition of Bitcoin and the relationship between nation states
and their national currencies (see e.g. Van Alstyne, 2014; Weber, 2014a; Dequesch, 2013).
However, the suggestion would appear to be that oﬃcial sanctions may have only a temporary
eﬀect upon decentralised cryptocurrency networks. The relatively temporary nature of this
China-related shock also appears consistent with the interpretation of Pilkington (2014).
In other cases it seems that the eﬀects of potentially damaging market events are dwarfed
by the sheer intensity of the Bitcoin bubble (Cheah and Fry, 2015). One example of this occurs
in the aftermath of the Bitcoin halving day (November 28th 2012). Further, both the glitch in
Bitcoin software (March 11th 2013) and the FBI closure of the Silk Road website (October 2nd
2013) also result in renewed bubble phases – possibly over fears of a limited future supply of
Bitcoins.
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Figure 2: Plot of weekly Ripple (XRP) price measured in Bitcoins from Jan 7th 2013 to Feb
24th 2015.
6 Conclusions
Amid huge media interest cryptocurrencies have attracted signiﬁcant amounts of popular atten-
tion (Vigna and Casey, 2015; Frisby, 2014). From an economic perspective the sums of money
involved are substantial. Several cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, have experienced dra-
matic ﬂuctuations in both market capitalisation and market share in recent years. Against this
backdrop the academic literature on cryptocurrencies has begun to emerge with a burgeoning
economics and ﬁnance literature (Bo¨hme et al, 2015; Weber, 2014; Cheah and Fry, 2015) com-
plimenting earlier studies related to law (Grinberg, 2012; Plasaras, 2013) and computer science
(Bo¨hme et al, 2014; Sadeghi, 2013).
Econophysics thus has a crucial role to play as global cryptocurrency markets continue to
evolve. Here, in addition to evidence of speculative bubbles (see e.g. Cheah and Fry, 2015;
Garcia et al., 2014; Cheung et al., 2015) recently developed econophysics models for negative
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Date αˆ e.s.e t-value p-value Tentative Conclusion
1. October 18th 2011 0.281 0.149 1.884 0.060 No evidence of
an eﬀect
2. November 28th 2012 -0.640 0.141 -4.526 0.000 Endogenous shock
(bubble)
3. March 11th 2013 1.000 0.0002 4791.905 0.000 Exogenous shock
(bubble)
4. April 13th 2013 0.628 0.131 4.780 0.000 Exogenous shock
(bubble)
5. May 15th 2013 -0.220 0.203 1.082 0.279 No evidence of
an eﬀect
6. October 2nd 2013 -1.527 0.211 7.237 0.000 Endogenous shock
(bubble)
7. December 5th 2013 0.821 0.160 5.12195 0.000 Exogenous shock
(crash)
8. February 7th 2014 0.069 0.200 0.343 0.731 No evidence of
an eﬀect
9. March 2nd 2014 -0.110 0.265 0.416 0.678 No evidence of
an eﬀect
Table 2: Results for the test of endogenous vs. exogenous shocks (equation 42)
bubbles also provide a useful description of cryptocurrency markets. Evidence for a negative
bubble is found from 2014 onwards in the two largest cryptocurrency markets Bitcoin and
Ripple. Further, evidence suggests that there is a spillover from Ripple (XRP) to Bitcoin that
exacerbates recent price falls in Bitcoin. This ﬁnding does reﬂect both concerns raised about
the long-term sustainability of Bitcoin (Dowd, 2014) and increased competition between rival
cryptocurrencies (Gandal and Ha laburda, 2014) that are potentially more ﬂexible (see Section
2). However, over the period in question the main conclusion appears to be that Ripple is
over-priced relative to Bitcoin.
Allied to the above a model for endogenous/exogenous shocks developed in Fry (2012) also
leads to new insights into cryptocurrency markets. We use our model to study a series of events
that are popularly thought to have aﬀected Bitcoin markets. It is interesting to note that the
eﬀect of these events upon Bitcoin markets is mixed. Inter alia the eﬀect of some market shocks
is simply dwarfed by the scale and extent of the speculative bubble in Bitcoin (Cheah and Fry,
2015). However, certain events do have a detectable impact upon the market. A technical
glitch in the Bitcoin software is shown to temporarily raise prices during the Bitcoin bubble in
March 2013. The FBI’s closure of the illegal Silk Road website in October 2013 has a similar
eﬀect. Finally, The People’s Bank of China’s banning of Chinese ﬁnancial institutions from using
Bitcoin is classiﬁed as an exogenous shock. Thus, it appears that though the Bitcoin bubble
fundamentally destabilises prices (Cheah and Fry, 2015) the bubble is actually brought to an
end by an exogenous shock – a picture that seems qualitatively similar to the bursting of the
internet stocks bubble in 2000 (Fry, 2012). This comparison between the Bitcoin and dot com
bubbles is made in purely qualitative terms in Yermack (2013).
This paper has explored a number of themes of wider importance such as statistical and
probabilistic approaches to econophysics, the relationship between econophysics and mainstream
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Figure 3: Plot of daily Bitcoin Coindesk Index from July 18th 2010 to February 28th 2015 and
the impact of putative market events (circled). The numbering of the market events is as shown
in Table 2.
ﬁnancial models and the creation of tools to monitor ﬁnancial stability and to assist economic
policy. Econophysics clearly has much to contribute. Future work will discuss the modelling
of self-fulﬁlling and self-denying prophecies in complex socio-technical systems (Biggs, 2009;
Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001). Potential ﬁnancial applications include the development of new
trading and hedging strategies. Future work incorporating more detailed information on trans-
action pairs of long and short positions would give a more comprehensive account of spillovers
across diﬀerent cryptocurrencies.
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· To date Bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets have been under-explored  
· Bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets contain a considerable speculative component and are 
extremely volatile 
· We use econophysics models to examine shocks and crashes in cyptocurrency markets 
· We examine competition between rival cryptocurrencies and find evidence of a spillover 
from Ripple to Bitcoin 
· The extent to which law enforcement and government measures can affect Bitcoin markets 
appears mixed 
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